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CONFLICTS AND THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE AROUND
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
HILLEL Y. LEVIN*
INTRODUCTION
Conflicts and choice of law questions arising from marriage
recognition are more multidimensional today than ever before.
Traditionally, these conflicts arose because one jurisdiction allowed
marriage between two individuals while another prohibited such a
marriage. This was the model in the consanguineous, polygamous, and
interracial marriage contexts. It has also been the primary model for
analyzing conflicts that arise in the context of same-sex relationships.
In a forthcoming article, Resolving Interstate Conflicts Arising
from Interstate Non-Marriage,' I challenge this model, and suggest
that the emergence of marriage-like 2 and marriage-lite 3 alternatives
(i.e., civil unions, domestic partnerships, reciprocal benefits
arrangements, etc.) for same-sex couples complicates and requires
additional nuance in our conflicts analysis. The article also suggests
that different jurisdictions with different recognition regimes for these
kinds of non-marriage relationships ought to resolve such conflicts
differently--even if they apply the very same conflicts methodology.
* Hillel Y. Levin is an assistant professor of law at the University of Georgia
School of Law. He thanks the participants in the symposium for their comments on
this Essay.
1. Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving Interstate Conflicts Arising from Interstate Non-
Marriage, 63 FLA. L. REv. 47 (2011) [hereinafter Resolving Interstate Conflicts]
2. As I use the term here and elsewhere, "marriage-like" relationships are
those that the state grants all, or substantially all, of the rights and responsibilities
traditionally associated with marriage to same-sex couples, but under a name other
than marriage. In the United States, these marriage-like alternatives are typically
called civil unions, though California's domestic partnership scheme also qualifies.
3. As I use the term here and elsewhere, "marriage-lite" relationships are those
that the state grants only a subset (and usually a very small subset) of the rights and
responsibilities traditionally associated with marriage to same-sex couples.
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This Essay intends to complement Resolving Interstate Conflicts
in two ways. First, it further explores my claim that the introduction of
marriage alternative schemes adds dimensions to the conflicts
analysis. Second, much more broadly, and likely more controversially,
it considers whether same-sex marriage advocates should pursue
conflicts-based arguments as a basis for expanding marriage
recognition in states that do not currently recognize same-sex
marriage. I believe the answer may be no-despite, and in part,
because of my unhesitating support for same-sex marriage. In other
words, I suggest that advocates for same-sex marriage should forgo
some arguments that, if successful, could help them expand
recognition of same-sex marriage.
I. A NEW CONFLICTS-BASED ARGUMENT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Until recently, lawsuits advocating recognition of same-sex
marriage were brought only in states that offered little or no
recognition of same-sex couples-states like Hawaii, Vermont, New
York, and Massachusetts. Lately, however, lawsuits demanding
recognition of same-sex marriage have been brought in states that
offer marriage-like alternatives such as civil unions and domestic
partnerships. Although this difference seems slight, and in most ways
is slight, it has important implications once we take conflicts into
account.
These implications can be seen by examining two of the most
recent cases seeking recognition of same-sex marriage in state courts.
In 2007, the supreme courts of California and Connecticut were
confronted with lawsuits seeking recognition of same-sex marriage.4
At first glance, these cases appeared no different from earlier cases
demanding recognition of same-sex marriage in states like
Massachusetts and Vermont. And, indeed, the substantive arguments
in the California and Connecticut cases were very much the same as
those in the earlier cases-arguing for same-sex marriage on the basis
of equality, due process, and/or fundamental rights. But, there was an
4. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan v. Conun'r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
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important difference in the context: the legislatures in California and
Connecticut-unlike those in states where marriage restrictions were
challenged in earlier cases-adopted, by this time, marriage-like
alternatives for same-sex couples. Specifically, California adopted
domestic partnershipss and Connecticut adopted civil unions.6 Thus,
the issue before the courts in these states was whether these marriage-
like alternatives were sufficient under the state constitutions.
In each case, a key question for the courts was whether the
marriage-like alternatives were substantively equal to marriage under
the law-that is, whether they carried all of the benefits of marriage,
or whether there were meaningful differences beyond the normative
ones resulting from the withholding of the title of marriage. The
lower courts in both states concluded that the marriage-like
alternatives were identical to marriage in all ways except for name,
and so they were equal enough, so to speak, under the law.8 As a
superior court judge opined, "civil union and marriage in Connecticut
now share the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under
law." 9
Fundamentally, the claim that marriage-like and marriage
relationships carry the same legal benefits is a factual one, of course.
On review, the California Supreme Court considered this factual
question to be so important that it requested further briefing from the
parties on whether there were "differences in legal rights or benefits
and legal obligations or duties ... under current California law
affecting those couples who are registered domestic partners as
compared to those couples who are legally married spouses." 0
5. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-297.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38aa (West 2009) (repealed 2009).
7. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398-99; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 411-15.
8. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 699-726 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006),
rev'd, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5 as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Cal.
2009); Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 102 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006), rev'd, 957 A.2d
407 (Conn. 2008).
9. Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 102.
10. News Release, Judicial Council of California, Summary of Cases Accepted
During the Week of June 18, 2007 (June 25, 2007) (on file with author), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/summaries/WS061807.PDF.
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Further, this question consumed a good part of oral arguments in both
the California and Connecticut cases. The reason for the California
and Connecticut courts' keen interest in this question is probably that
they were already prepared to hold, at least, that the states'
constitutions required equality of treatment for same-sex couples.
Indeed, it may well be that the courts were begging the petitioners to
argue and demonstrate that their marriage-like alternatives were not
functionally identical to marriage. Had the advocates succeeded in
doing so, the courts may have grabbed the opportunity to declare that
the state constitutions demanded full equality. After all, why pose the
question of whether the marriage-like alternatives were practically
equal to marriage if not to signal that inequalities would not be
tolerated?
In each case, however, both sides essentially agreed on the
substantive equivalence of marriage and the marriage-like alternatives.
That is, even the attorneys for the petitioners seeking recognition of
same-sex marriage conceded that marriage and marriage-like were
functionally and legally equivalent, with only very slight and minor
legal differences." In neither case did the petitioners rest their
arguments on, or even substantially pursue, the claim that the states'
treatment of same-sex couples was substantively different from their
treatment of opposite-sex couples.
However, each state's handling of the marriage/marriage-like
conflict suggests that the advocates may have conceded too quickly.
Indeed, there were meaningful differences between marriage and the
marriage-like alternatives offered in those states. Specifically, under
the prevailing law in both states, California and Connecticut refused to
treat same-sex marriages performed in other states as having any
11. See Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants with Separate Appendix at 10,
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. S.C. 17716)
(conceding that the legislature "acknowledg[ed] that committed lesbian and gay
couples are identically situated to and deserving of the same legal rights as married
couples . . . ."); Oral Argument, Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 (No. S168047), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/prop8.htm (follow "MP3
Audio of the March 5th oral argument" hyperlink) ("There are tangible rights and
benefits at stake in today's debate, but you're right that more important, and what
divides the parties is a symbol, and that symbol has deep meaning for people on both
sides of the case . . . . More important[] than the tangible differences is the name
'marriage.' The name matters.").
HeinOnline -- 41 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 96 2010
2010] SHIFTING LANDSCAPE AROUND SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS 97
status under state law.12 That is, same-sex couples were neither
recognized as married under forum law nor as having entered into the
local marriage-like alternative. This meant that same-sex couples
lawfully married elsewhere (say, in Massachusetts), who subsequently
moved to California or Connecticut were treated differently from
similarly-situated opposite-sex couples. Indeed, opposite-sex couples
who married in Massachusetts and relocated to California were, of
course, treated as married; same-sex couples who did the same were
nothing.
Consider the implications of this approach. A spouse in a same-
sex relationship who married in Massachusetts and moved to
California or Connecticut would have no hospital visitation, end-of-
life decision-making, or inheritance rights. If the couple chose to
dissolve the relationship, no court would have jurisdiction. And so
forth. All of this even though California and Connecticut allowed and
encouraged gay and lesbian couples to enter into marriage-like
relationships in which these questions would seemingly be non-issues.
This treatment of same-sex couples, in comparison to similarly-
situated opposite-sex couples, is an obvious instance of true inequality
between marriage and the marriage-like alternatives offered by these
states. Rather than concede that marriage-like relationships were, at
least from a legal perspective, identical to marriage relationships,
advocates could have made something of this difference.
In other words, the existence of this new kind of conflict arising
from the emergence of marriage alternatives and the way in which
12. For Connecticut's decision, see Conn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-024
(2005), 2005 WL 2293060. For a discussion concerning California's approach, see
Nancy L. Ober & Paul R. Lynd, The Wedding Cake Falls: An Update on Same-Sex
Marriage and Domestic Partner Issues After the San Francisco Marriage Decision,
ASAP (September 2004), http://www.littler.com (under "search," enter "wedding
cake falls" and follow the hyperlink) ("Same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions
. . . will not trigger any rights under California's domestic partnership law.
Individuals in lawful marriages-even those not recognized in California-are
excluded from California's domestic partnership law."). It is worth noting that the
law in California subsequently changed, and California will now recognize foreign
same-sex marriages as having the legal status of either marriage or domestic
partnership, depending on when the marriage was performed. This change came
about with the Marriage Recognition and Family Protection Act (now embodied in
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308(a)-(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)).
HeinOnline -- 41 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 97 2010
98 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
these states resolved it-namely, by refusing to recognize married
same-sex couples from other jurisdictions as having any status under
forum law-offers an independent legal argument in favor of marriage
equality. A court inclined towards requiring equal treatment of same-
sex couples and opposite-sex couples might have leapt at the
opportunity to strike down a marriage alternative in favor of marriage,
given this unequal treatment.
Thus, the emergence of marriage alternatives for same-sex
couples complicates and adds new dimensions to the battle over same-
sex marriage-even beyond the conflicts context; and in this case,
may provide a new equality-based argument for same-sex marriage in
the context I have just described. That is, if a state adopts a marriage-
like recognition scheme, but refuses to recognize same-sex couples
married in another state for any purposes under forum law, then,
purely as a factual matter, opposite-sex couples are treated differently
than same-sex couples. A court inclined to demand full equality may
see this inequality as a sufficient basis for requiring recognition of
same-sex marriage.13
13. It is interesting to consider why the advocates did not pursue this
argument. With respect to the Connecticut case, according to the incomparable Mary
Bonauto (who would know better than anyone, having carried much of the load in
the case), marriage advocates were well aware of the Connecticut Attorney
General's opinion that foreign same-sex marriages would be accorded no status
under Connecticut law; but, nevertheless, the advocates declined to pursue this as a
basis for demanding equality. According to Bonauto, the advocates for same-sex
marriage understood the attorney general's opinion to be simply mistaken as a
matter of conflicts law (a position I agree with), and thus nothing more than an
opinion that would fall if ever tested in court. Thus, it was not worth pursuing in the
marriage equality case. Where Bonauto and I diverge, however, is with respect to
the significance of the attorney general's opinion-even if it was wrong as a matter
of law and likely to be rejected by courts. In my view, this opinion was effectively
the law of the state until it fell in court. State agencies were likely to follow it-
indeed, state agencies requested that the attorney general file an opinion-and some
same-sex couples may have borne its brunt. That such couples may have ultimately
succeeded in having their foreign same-sex marriages recognized in Connecticut
after drawn-out litigation is of little solace.
With respect to the California case, it is not altogether clear why the
advocates did not pursue the argument that I have described. In California, the
refusal to treat foreign same-sex marriages as having any status under local law was
not due to a decision of the attorney general, but rather was apparently the creature
of a statute. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). Two
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II. WHY ADVOCATES SHOULD BE WARY OF USING CONFLICTS-BASED
ARGUMENTS TO EXPAND MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
At this Symposium, some presenters have argued, as others have
before, that marriage advocates may be able to expand marriage
recognition by resorting to conflicts law. In particular, Sherman
Rogers and Andrew Koppelman suggested that states might be
required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize marriages
from foreign states. In other words, they argue DOMA is
unconstitutional in its entirety. Arguments along these lines have been
possibilities come to mind. First, it is possible that advocates in California were
simply unaware of the implications of California's scheme for foreign same-sex
married couples. Although I hesitate to attribute this oversight to these able
advocates, it does not seem all that farfetched to me. Conflict and choice of laws has
always been a murky area of the law. Conflicts scholars are often perceived by the
rest of the academy as wonkish, monkish, bookish sorts, consumed by their own
private debates (often held in seemingly foreign languages). Second, although
marriage advocates and legal scholars in this area have long taken conflicts
seriously, the complications introduced by the advent of marriage-like and marriage-
lite alternatives have been virtually off-the-radar. In researching for my own article
on the subject, I found virtually nothing in the literature. Thus, advocates would be
forgiven for not identifying and pursuing this argument.
But, there are alternative explanations. It could be that advocates for same-
sex marriage were aware of this inequality and the argument it suggested, but feared
that courts would have stopped short of requiring recognition of same-sex marriage
on its account. Instead, courts might have simply required the states to treat same-
sex couples married in Massachusetts as though they had entered into the local
marriage-like alternative. This would have extended legally equivalent treatment to
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, while continuing to withhold the term
"marriage." Ultimately, of course, this is not what marriage advocates sought; they
wanted full marriage equality, including the name. Thus, the petitioners may have
downplayed the legal differences between marriage and the marriage-like
alternatives as a gamble, hoping to push the courts to declare that even where
marriage and the marriage-like alternatives are substantively identical, they still do
not achieve full equality-a powerful precedent for future cases.
Relatedly, it is possible that the advocates wished to minimize the
differences between marriage and the marriage-like alternative because they wished
to make the point that if there really is no difference between a marriage and a
domestic partnership or civil union, then there is no rational basis for giving them
different names. If this was indeed their strategy, it proved successful: both courts
ruled that the difference in name was unequal enough on its own to require the states
to recognize marriage.
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kicking around for some time. I have little to say about the substantive
merits of these arguments. Instead, I suggest that advocates should be
exceedingly wary of pursuing them in court--even if they were
convinced that these arguments would prevail.14 Once again, I say this
despite, and in part, because of, my support for same-sex marriage.
What follows are three reasons to be wary, followed by a caveat that
limits and clarifies my conclusion that conflicts law should not be the
basis upon which same-sex marriage advocates litigate.
A. The Strategic Dangers ofPursuing Conflicts-Based Arguments
The first reason to be wary is simply a strategic one: even if a
conflicts-based argument could win in court, winning such an
argument could induce a backlash so extreme that it consumes any
immediate victory achieved.
As we all know too well by now, convincing a court or even a
legislature to require recognition of same-sex marriage does not
guarantee that such a decision will stick. For instance, although the
California Supreme Court required the state to recognize same-sex
marriage, a ballot initiative overturned the court's ruling.'5 Similarly,
in Maine, a ballot initiative overturned the legislature's passage of a
law recognizing same-sex relationships.16 Even more importantly,
nearly every time a state court moves towards recognition of same-sex
relationships, other states move to pass laws or amend their
constitutions to prohibit any recognition of same-sex relationships. 7
14. 1 have my doubts as to whether such arguments could prevail. Speaking as
a legal realist, a court disinclined to require marriage equality on the basis of equal
protection, due process, or fundamental rights is not likely to be persuaded on full
faith and credit or other conflicts grounds. Thus, it does not seem that such
arguments add much value. Nevertheless, I concede that it is possible that a court
could do so and, therefore, assume arguendo that someone might consider making
this argument.
15. Proposition 8 overturned the California Supreme Court case.
Subsequently, Proposition 8 was upheld in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 119 (Cal.
2009).
16. Kevin Dwyer, Maine Gay Marriage Law Repealed, ABC NEWS (Nov. 4,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/maine-gay-marriage-law-repealed/story
?id=8992720.
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Immodest Proposal, NEW REPUBLIC (December
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Sometimes, as in Michigan, these moves not only prevent forward
momentum, they also roll back rights that same-sex couples had
already secured in those states.18 Most recently, and for these reasons,
after high-powered attorneys Ted Olson and David Boies filed a
lawsuit in federal court demanding recognition of same-sex marriage
under the U.S. Constitution, some long-time advocates of same-sex
marriage argued that this would do more harm than good.19 Thus,
same-sex marriage advocates can lose the war by winning the battle.
I suspect that an argument grounded in conflicts doctrine would
be even more likely to spark staunch opposition than one grounded in
equality, due process, or fundamental rights. It is one thing to identify
a jurisdiction that is sympathetic to arguments for marriage equality;
this stirs the pot, but the country obviously reconciled itself to the
notion that some states will recognize same-sex marriage. It is another
thing entirely, I think, to enter a hostile jurisdiction and demand
marriage recognition on the grounds of full faith and credit. If a court
in such a jurisdiction were to agree, there would likely be such an
intense nationwide backlash that the marginal victory would at best be
ephemeral.
Recall that in an earlier battle over the proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment, which would have outlawed same-sex marriage
throughout the country, several opponents of same-sex marriage
declined to support the amendment on the grounds that it was
unnecessary-because states could decline to recognize same-sex
22, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/immodest-proposal (discussing the
backlash from state court decisions requiring recognition of same-sex marriage).
18. See Nat'1 Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524
(Mich. 2008). For more about this case, see Recent Case, State Constitutional Law-
Same-Sex Relations-Supreme Court of Michigan Holds that Public Employers May
Not Provide Healthcare Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Employees.-
National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich.
2008), 122 HARv. L. REv. 1263 (2009).
19. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr. & Darren Spedale, Sit Down, Ted Olson
and David Boies, SLATE (May 29, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2219252. For background on the case, see, for example, Lisa Leff, High-Stakes
Gay Marriage Trial to Begin in Calif, ABC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9504576 ("Gay marriage trial to begin in
California, could set legal precedent for generations to come.").
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marriages from other states.20 If a court held otherwise, the Federal
Marriage Amendment could be on the table once again; and even if
unlikely to be adopted (given the steady progress in public support for
same-sex marriage), the debate itself could shape the political terrain
in ways ultimately destructive to marriage equality. This view appears
to be shared by the seasoned advocates who actually litigate these
cases, as they seem to have made a conscious choice not to pursue
conflicts-based arguments as a wedge for expanding same-sex
marriage.
B. Conflicts is a Shield, and Not a Sword, for
Advocates of Same-Sex Marriage
Assume for a moment that there would be no substantial backlash
against a judicial opinion requiring recognition of same-sex marriage
on conflicts grounds. In other words, assume that strategic
considerations were swept aside. I still believe that marriage advocates
ought to be very wary of pursuing conflicts-based arguments.
The battle for recognition of same-sex marriage has long been
premised on a states' rights approach. Since Baehr v. Lewin,21
marriage advocates have publicly argued that the people of, say,
Georgia or Alabama need not worry if, say, Hawaii or Massachusetts
adopts same-sex marriage. We have argued that this is a matter
internal to the states.22 Thus, to turn around and use conflicts as a
wedge to achieve recognition in other states would be disingenuous.
We ought to be wary of sacrificing our credibility and the principles
we have articulated. We have used conflicts as a shield; to now use it
as a sword would be a mistake.
20. For example, John McCain opposed the Federal Marriage Amendment on
federalism grounds, but indicated that his opinion could change if judges began to
require states to recognize same-sex marriages performed in foreign states. See
McCain on Gay Marriage Amendment: Not Yet, SWAMP (June 6, 2006, 4:11 PM),
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2006/06/mccainongay marriag
e_amendme.html. For more about the Federal Marriage Amendment, see Dale
Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and
Anti-Democratic, CATO INSTITUTE (June 1, 2006), http://www.cato.org/pub-display.
php?pub id=6379.
21. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
22. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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I want to be clear that this objection is not legal in nature.
Lawyers are permitted-and may even be required by their duty of
zealous advocacy-to make mutually inconsistent arguments in
different cases on behalf of different clients. Thus, arguing that states
are protected from the marriage-based decisions of other states by
conflicts doctrine does not preclude advocates from arguing that other
states must recognize foreign same-sex marriages. Rather than a legal
objection, my objection is based on a simple principle: we should not
dupe people for the purpose of achieving the goal of same-sex
marriage.
C. The Battle for Same-Sex Marriage Will be Achieved Through
Persuasion Based on First Principles, Not Technicalities.
Finally, nationwide recognition of same-sex marriage will, should,
and can only be achieved through public persuasion. Specifically, if
marriage equality is to be achieved, it will be because people have
become convinced that same-sex marriage is desirable for our country.
I do not mean to suggest, as some have, that courts ought to stay out
of the fight over same-sex marriage. Courts, countermajoritarian
though they may be (at least in those states where there are no judicial
elections), do have a role in the process of public persuasion. First,
courts issue opinions that may, at least in an idealized sense, persuade.
After all, courts give much more complete reasons for their decisions
than legislatures ever do. Second, as more states adopt same-sex
marriage, even if as a result of court rulings, people will likely see that
the sky does not fall, children are not harmed, marriage continues to
mean something, and families are strengthened.
But to the extent that courts do have a role, we would be better off
if their opinions focused on core notions of equality, due process, or
fundamental rights, rather than on the technicalities of conflicts law.
D. A Caveat
I do not mean to suggest that conflicts ought to have no role in
litigation over same-sex relationships. But I hope that the role it plays
will be limited and incremental in nature. As I have extensively
argued elsewhere, under conflicts doctrine, states that recognize same-
sex marriage should treat couples who have entered into foreign civil
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unions as married for the purposes of forum law, and vice versa.23
Further, states that offer no recognition of same-sex couples, including
those states that have their own mini-DOMAs, should nevertheless
recognize some limited incidents of foreign marriages and civil
unions. To the extent that such states refuse to do so, I have no
principled objection to advocates pursuing this kind of limited
recognition through litigation, though strategic concerns may continue
to have force. What I object to in principle, even if not doctrinally, are
the grander claims that all states must recognize all same-sex
marriages from other states for all purposes.
CONCLUSION
I suspect that we are closer to the end of the battle over same-sex
marriage than we are to the beginning. That is, it will not be long until
same-sex marriage is adopted throughout the country. However, we
are currently in an interstitial period in which American opinion
concerning homosexuality is evolving. All of the conflicts of law that
arose from the adoption of same-sex marriage and marriage-
alternatives are a result of the frictions introduced by this evolutionary
process. Short-circuiting this evolutionary process could, in the best
case, achieve same-sex marriage immediately, or, in the worst case,
set the movement back considerably. I believe the risk of substantial
setback outweighs the possibility of immediate recognition of same-
sex marriage. Setback is, in my judgment, more likely, and the results
would be devastating.
23. See Levin, supra note 1.
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